Perspectivas Energéticas para a América Latina

CHINA’S ENERGY STRATEGY IN LATIN AMERICA AND ITS POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

INTRODUCTION

The Chinese growing interest in Latin America is a recent phenomenon which can be observed approximately since less than a decade[1]. In fact, although the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been active in Africa since the 1960’s, it has been reluctanct, especially during the Cold War but even after, until the end of the XX century, to enter the region which was considered as the American’s backyard[2]. Until 1990, Indonesia, Oman and Iran were China’s principal suppliers of oil. Nevertheless, during this last decade, China has been a land with an extraordinary economic growth of 9,1 % on average per year, only allowed by high energy consumption, and in the Chinese case, thanks to an increasing amount of oil importation. The PRC has been a net oil importer since 1993, and due to the global competition for energy ressources as a result of the fossile energy’s growing depletion, Beijing’s energy policy is now focused on diversifacation of energy sources to secure a medium to long term supply[3]. Because of Indonesia’s diminishing reserves and the United States’ (US) hegemony influence in most countries of the Middle East (especially after the 2003 Iraq intervention), Latin America emerges as a strategic region[4].
Thus, while the Chinese interests in the region may appear largely linked to energy ressources, they also have other economic, political and diplomatic dimension. This paper will therefore explore firstly, the Chinese economic expansion in Latin America, focusing on energy ressources as a main concern. Secondly, the political and diplomatic influences will be developped, to finally give us the opportunity to think thirdly, if China represents or not a possible rival to US supremacy in the region.

I – ECONOMIC EXPANSION AND ENERGY SUPPLY AS A MAIN CONCERN

1.1 – A growing trade

In 1975, the PRC’s total trade with Latin America amounted to mere 200 million dollars and it slowly increased to only 2,8 billion dollars by 1988. Yet, from 1993 to 2003, their commercial flux knew an expansion of 600 %, when total trade between the two reached 26,8 billion dollars. In 2004, the amount was still growing and reached almost 40 billion dollars[5] and in 2005 it became even more important, raising up to 50 billion dollars[6].
Even if imports from Latin America represent just a small percentage of China’s overall imports, it is relevant to note their performance during these last years. We could observe that, between 1999 and 2004, the overall imports passed from 1,81 % to 3,88 % of Chinese total imports. In other words, China’s imports increased more than 600 % in five years, growing from 3 billion dollars in 1999 to 21,7 billion dollars in 2004, most of which concern five top import markets: Brazil ($ 8,7 billion), Chile ($ 3,7 billion), Argentina ($ 3,3 billion), Mexico ($ 2,1 billion) and Peru ($1,5 billion). Therefore, for the last years, this growth in imports from Latin America induced a trade deficit for China in its commercial balance with the region.
At the same moment, although Latin America percentage of Chinese worldwide exports had experienced just a thin increase from 2,71 % in 1999 to 3,09 % in 2004, in absolute terms, the amount has also grown remarkably, from 5,3 billion dollars in 1999 to 18,3 billion dollars in 2004. The top five export destinations in the region were Mexico ($ 5 billion), Brazil ($ 3,7 billion), Panama ($ 2,2 billion), Chile ($ 1,7 billion) and Argentina ($ 852 million).
Chinese economic expansion in Latin America has shown itself likewise virulent in foreign direct investment (FDI). As meaning of illustration, in 2003, the region was the destination for more than one third of the PRC’s global foreign investment flows, amounting to 1,04 of a total of 2,85 billion dollars[7], which places Latin America as Chinese principal target for its FDI outside Asia, specially concerning Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Argentina, Peru and Venezuela[8]. Bearing in mind the region’s declining attraction of FDI between 2000 and 2003 (from $ 78 billion to $ 36 billion), every Latin American country welcomes Chinese promising approach[9]. As widely reported, in November 2004, the PRC’s President Hu Jintao “carried out the most extensive tour of the region ever made by a Chinese head of state”[10]. In exchange of considering China as a market economy, President Hu stated during his speech to the Brazilian Congress that China would invest 100 billion dollars in Latin America in the next ten years.

1.2 – The Chinese appetite for Latin American raw materials

Even if Chinese investment in the region also includes manufacturing assembly, telecommunications and textiles, it is nonetheless clearly focused on the extraction and the production of primary ressources. In fact, Latin America constitutes a real reservoir of raw materials, owning for example 25 % of the world’s silver, 30 % of tin and 45 % of copper. In this last case, China, being the world’s leading consumer of copper, imports 40 % of its necessity only from Chile[11]. Other Beijing’s purchased commodities include bauxite, cooper, iron ore, manganese, zinc, timber, tin, nickel and soybeans[12]. This Chinese growing purveyance in Latin American raw materials has already raised the attention of many other important consumers, in Asia for example, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited Brazil and South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun went to Argentina, Brazil and Chile in the same year of 2004, both with the objective to secure their strategic importations.
Moreover, strenghtening trade and investments and enlarging its importation spectrum, China is better positioned to assure it’s strategic interests in the energy field[13].

1.3 – Chinese energy dependence and Latin America as a strategic supplier

Chinese dependence on foreign energy has become a crucial matter for its leaders who percieve the present situation as possibly endangering the desired international role of China. Indeed, even if China still posseses non-explored oil ressources, due to its extraordinary fast economy expansion which generates a greater demand than production in a short term, the imported part of the country’s total oil consumption increased from 27 % in 1999 to 37 % in 2002 and 43 % 2005. Being the eighth largest oil importer in 2000, the fourth in 2003 and the third in 2004, China will probably occupy the second place, just behind the US, before the end of this decade[14].
Latin America, for its turn, is estimated to posses no more than 13,5 % of world’s total proven oil reserves and accounts for less than 10 % of the global production. However, facing an intesified concurrence with some of its Asian neighbours (as Japan or India) and percieving the American renewal geopolitical strategy in the Middle East, the PRC recently hold efforts in diversifying its energy ressources importations in order to avoid becoming over-reliant on just a few suppliers. Consequently, following Chinese necessity to increase both its imports and suppliers, regions such as Africa or Latin America emerge as inescapables[15].
According to the British energy company, BP, in 2005, China’s oil import came mostly from the Middle East (40 %), Africa (23 %) and Asia (21 %)[16]. In fact, Beijing relies little on Latin America for its oil needs – the region represent only 3 % of China’s global supply – nevertheless, this situation will probably change in the next following years, when we may observe an increasing importance attributed by China to the region[17]. Chinese energy footprint in Latin America can already be well noted, which can illustrate the deployment of direct aquisition in the participation of energy companies, the incremental number of joint ventures with state companies and the heavy investment in infrastructure such as transport, pipelines and refineries.
The PRC energetic strategy approaching Latin America has been conduced in majority by its two main oil firms, the China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC) and the China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec), the Chinese government retaining the principal stake in both of them.
In November 2004, Chinese President Hu Jintao announced a 10 billion dollars agreement with Brazil for investments in energy and transport infrastructure to be implemented in two years, from which $ 1,3 billion concern the construction of a gas pipeline linking the north-east and the south-east of this Latin-American country. At the same occasion, Sinopec signed a cooperation commitment with the Brazilian also state-owned oil company, Petrobras, for joint oil exploration, production, refining, product sales, petrochemicals and pipelines. Moreover, it was stated that this cooperation will involve Chinese technical assistance in the recovery of mature oil fields in exchange to Brazilian assistance with deep sea drilling in the China Sea[18].
Among the Andes countries, the Chinese appetite for energy has also been strongly felt. In Peru, for 200 million dollars, CNPC acquired 45 % of PlusPetrol Norte in 2004, the main crude oil producer in the country. In Ecuador, a CNPC-Sinopec led consortium, Andes Petroleum, bought for 1,4 billion dollars the ecuadorian assets of a Canadian oil firm, EnCana, getting the control of 75,000 barrels per day production and a total proven reserve of 143 million barrels of crude oil. The same consortium also purchased a strategic 36 % participation in Ecuador’s Oleoducto de Crudos Pesados, the new national heavy crude oil pipeline, which pumps 450,000 barrels per day, giving the Chinese companies the possibilty to exert some control over direction of exports throught that output.
In Mexico, after the visits of Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao in December 2003 and President Hu Jintao in September 2005, both countries signed oil contracts and the CNPC has as well obtained drilling licences.
As we can see, China is investing in diversified energy issues all over the Latin American continent but, as some specialists suggest, among them Ph.D. François Lafargue, it is Venezuela which “constitutes the cornerstone of Beijing’s diplomacy in Latin America”.
Venezuela is the western largest oil reserve owner, representing 6,5 % of world proven reserves and was the sixth largest world oil producer in 2004. Concerning natural gas, the country also has abundant ressources, which amount to a total of 2,4 % of known world reserves.
In December 2004, during an official visit to Beijing, Venezuela’s current President Hugo Chávez signed ambitious economic and commercial cooperation agreements with Hu Jintao. Sinopec and Petroleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA) engaged together in offshore gas exploration in 2004, and in 2005, both countries created a joint company with the purpose to develop the Zumano field in the state of Anzoategui, where oil reserves are estimated at 400 million barrels. In the occasion of the visit by Chinese Vice-President Zeng Qinghong to Caracas in January 2005, several agreements were established permitting China to invest 350 million dollars in the development of 15 oilfields, which could yield a 1 billion barrels reserve, and 60 million dollars in other oil-related infrastructure such as railway network and refineries.
As statistics suggest, this cooperation in energy matters between the two countries has already shown itself as mutually beneficial. In 2004, Venezuela represented 0,5 % of Chinese total oil imports, shifting a daily flow of 12,000 barrels. In one year, this volume was almost six times greater, raising up to 68,000 barrels per day in 2005, and its part of Chinese total oil import grew to 1,8 %. Thanks to this inicial success, President Chávez plans to double his country’s oil production by 2012 for China’s specific supply, and this last one therefore expects to multiply its annual imports from that country nearly five times[19].
As seen, China’s growing trade and direct investment in Latin America is mainly linked with its interest in the region’s raw materials ressources. More specifically, the sub-continent is percieved as a strategic supplier by the Beijing authorities, according to its diversifying energy importation policy. In consequence to this Chinese economic expansion, we can observe some increasing political implications with the region, where the Taiwan factor constitutes a main concern for the PRC.

II – POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS AND THE “ONE CHINA POLICY” AS A MAIN CONCERN

2.1 – China’s willing to be a major global actor

Overall, China’s economic engagement in Latin America has helped to facilitate its political relationships, as the recent oficial visits interchange can illustrate. In April 2001, President Jiang Zemin leaded a 13-day tour in the region, and in November 2004, President Hu Jintao in his 16-day trip visited four Latin American states, participating at the 12th Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Chile’s capital Santiago, and improving contact among regional organizations such as the China-Latin America Forum, China-South American Common Market dialogue and China-Andean Community consultation.
In the other direction, expressing their interest in enhancing cultural and economic ties with the PRC, almost all Latin American leaders now have led high-level missions to its Asian partner. For example, in December 2004, Hugo Chávez became the third Latin American head of state to visit China that year, succeeding Argentine Nestor Kirchner and Brazilian Luis Inácio Lula da Silva[20].
During his visit, President Hu Jintao suggested a “new era” in Sino-Latin American political relations, after obtaining the “market economy” status recognization from many of its partners, which conceds China a greater protection under World Trade Organization (WTO) rules against anti-dumping duties on its exports. This Chinese diplomatic acquisition follows its desire to solidify its position and to be a more active member in the international organizations, through which Beijing belives to be capable to exerce a deeper influence in the global system.
Another well-known Chinese gesture, to win prestige and support in the region, is its deployment of a “special police” UN peacekeeping contingent to Haiti in September 2004 – China’s first military action in the Western hemisphere.
In fact, all these Chinese political approaches to Latin America are consistent with its willing to be a major global actor of “an envolving multi-polar world and with its historical self-conception as a leader of the developing world” [21].

2.2 – The leadership of a “Third World Solidarity”

Beijing’s authorities often claim that all developping countries share common ground and that the PRC “would forever stay on the side of developping countries” because of their “Third World entities” [22].
Although sometimes Latin American countries percieve China more as a competitor, as for exemple Mexico fearing to lose its US market share, more often in these recent years a relation based on economic and political cooperation has been stressed [23].
Reflecting this, in the same collaborative tone of his predecessor, Hu Jintao emphasized during his visit “increased investment and technological advancements as his country’s main priority in the region and as the necessary precursors for achieving mutually beneficial economic growth”. Moreover, with increasing trade mutual benefits and political close ties, some experts suggest that Sino-Latin American relations entered their “best period in history”, thanks to the observation of a concrete solidarity between them [24].
Probably the best example to illustrate this “Third World Solidarity” in the region are the relations established between China and Brazil during this last decade. In 1994, both countries officially defined their relationship as “strategic partnership”. In the recent years, they have cooperated for example in satellite technology, energy sector, infrastructure development and aircraft manufacturing. Perhaps even more emblematic, China and Brazil have joined together as leaders of the “Group of 20” (G-20) during the Doha Round negotiations within the WTO to support agricultural safeguards for less-developped nations[25].
However, even acknowledging the implications of China’s willing to be a major global actor as well as a leader of a “Third World Solidarity”, in a more realistic view, one might suggest that Chinese political approach to Latin America is mainly related to its “One China policy”.

2.3 – “One China policy” as a main concern

During the Cold War, due to its symbiotic relation with the US, most Latin American countries awaited Richard Nixon’s visit to Beijing in February 1972 before establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC. It was the case for Argentina and Mexico in 1972, Brazil two years after and finally Bolivia in 1985 [26].
Nowadays, however, as we have seen above, China is expanding its economic and political ties with the ancient North-American backyard. In the political sphere, China’s rhetoric frenquently lays on a developping country’s cooperation which often obtains a certain degree of success with its Latin American counterparts. Still, many experts suggest that Chinese political dynamic regarding the sub-continent is better understood if considering Beijing’s “One China policy”.
In fact, by the beginning of 2004, the 27 countries that were still maintaining official diplomatic relations with Taiwan, 14 were located in the region. In the following year, this number decreased for 12, as Grenada and Dominica switched diplomatic recognition to the PRC [27]. In the current month, June 2007, it was Costa Rica’s turn to abandon its relationship with Taiwan. As reported by the press, the Central American’s President, Oscar Arias, openly recognized that his decision was a consequence of Chinese growing economic power, and that it was the matter of “elementary realism” according to his words [28].
So at the present moment, Latin America count for 11 of the 24 countries that still recognize Taiwan: Belize, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, St Kitts and Nevis, St Vincent and the Grenadines, and the only South American country, Paraguay. Indeed, some analysts suggest that, at the same level of importance than the energy supply doctrine, the “One China policy” is a main goal for Beijing’s interests in Latin America.
To persue its political objective, the PRC counts at least three vectors to develop and expand its contacts in the region. Firstly, as one Taiwanese official referred, China has been implementing a vast “dollar diplomacy”. Secondly, since May 2004, the country has been accepted by the Organization of American States’ (OAS) as a formal observer, meanwhile Beijing has strongly objected to Taiwan’s effort to seek the same status [29]. Thirdly, since 1996, the Hong Kong-based port-operating company Hutchison Whampoa Limited (HWL) has taken control on leases for a period of 25 years over two port terminals in Panama’s Canal, Cristobal and Balboa. This Chinese influence in the control of the Canal can be percieved as a diplomatic weapon for Beijing, by pressuring the local states which still have diplomatic relations with Taiwan, as these nations’ trade is largely depending on this commercial artery [30].
Finally, some specialists suggest that if China succeeds in shifting Taiwan’s Latin American relationships, this substancial diminishment of Taipei’s recognition on the world stage could seriously affect its independent international status [31].
As seen so far, during these last years, thanks to its economic expansion and its strengthening political ties, China has arised as a main actor in Latin America. Thus, in order to establish predictions, many international relations authors are asking themselves if the PRC could be a future rival to US’ hegemonic influence in the region.

III – A FUTURE RIVAL TO U.S.’ HEGEMONIC INFLUENCE IN THE REGION ?

3.1 – The perceptions towards China as a raising revisionist power

The PRC’s increasing approach to Latin America is often percieved as a threat to US’ interests, specially concerning the energy supply issues. According to a Jamestown Foundation analyst, “nowhere is the Sino-US energy competition more evident than in the United States’ backyard”. Moreover, as many argue, this competition for energy ressources in the sub-continent is unlikely to be confined to the economic sphere as seen by developments in other regions. For illustration, we can quote China’s military cooperation with Myanmar, Sudan and the Central Asian Republics, which should not be seperated from its attempts to access energy ressources in these states [32].
Some authors attribute the success of Chinese diplomacy to the reduced interest of the President George W. Bush administration showed towards Latin America in his both mandates, which could have given China the possibility for further economic, political and military ties with the region.
In fact, the PRC’s presence has been recently encouraged by Latin American governments willing to reduce the commercial and financial US’ regional influence [33]. A growing number of Latin American states with left-leaning regimes are leading governments that question Washington’s economic model – it’s clearly the case at least for Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela.
Obviously, China is not resisting the strategic temptation represented by US’ recent lack of influence. As an emblematic M. Chávez speech illustrates: “We have been producing and exporting oil for more than 100 years but they have been years of dependence on the US market. Now we are free and we make our ressources available to the great country of China”.
Indeed, Venezuela – US’ fourth largest oil supplier – seems to be emerging as a major prize in the Sino–North-American competition for energy ressources in Latin America [34].
In the political arena, Chinese influence in the domestic life affairs of many Latin American countries in no more questionable. Indeed, as a Miami Herald columnist has observed, “President Hu Jintao spent more time in Latin America last year than President Bush”, while “China’s Vice President, Zeng Qinghong, spent more time in the region last month than his U.S. counterpart, Vice President Dick Cheney, over the past four years” [35].
Meanwhile, in December 2004, during a visit by Hugo Chávez to Beijing, the Chinese Communist Party intended to strenght its support to the Venezuelan President’s “Movement for the Fifth Republic” and its regional leadershiping in the “Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas”. This political decision was far from unique since China has maintaining close relations with this kind of revolutionary movements, including as well the “Movement Towards Socialism” in Bolivia leded by President Evo Morales [36].
Concerning China’s militar influence in Latin America, the most important areas to pay attention are basically the following ones: the cooperation in technological and intelligence strategic areas (as illustrates the Sino-Brazilian aerospace cooperation or the Sino-Cuban military and intelligence ties), the increasing militar official visits (in 2004, Chinese defense officials made 20 visits to the region, while Ministers and Chiefs of Defense from nine Latin American countries visited the PRC), the militar equipement sale (mostly feared by the US are speculations concerning a Venezuelan interest in Chinese belical material supply) and the increased provocative declarations of some Latin Americans leaders towards Washington (President Hugo Chávez constituing the best example) [37].
Finally, as we can presume, some observers support that Chinese growing linkages with Latin America represent a future threat to US interests. They argue that the PRC, acting as a revisionist rising power, “is using Latin America to challenge United States supremacy in the Westren Hemisphere” by exploiting weaknesses left by US’ inattentiveness to the region.

3.2 – The perceptions towards China as a benign expansionist

In opposition to the previously reported, some other observers defend the point of view that Chinese activity in Latin America is one of benign expansion, mostly restricted to trade and investment opportunities [38]. Moreover, althought China is strengthening its links with the region, it does not consider it valuable enough to risk a clash with the US. So, the PRC would certainly therefore show itself reluctant in offering political support to its Latin American allies when this runs too contrary to US’ interests.
They also suggest that the PRC’s inroad into the region are marginal compared with longstanding US economic linkages. In fact, statistics seem to confirm their argumentation, observing that in 2005, Latin America sent 47 % of its total exports to the US while only 4 % to China [39]. Or in absolute terms, Chinese performance in the region remains small when compared to US’ numbers: 195 billion dollars in trade and 25 billion dollars in direct investments with Latin America.
Concerning strategic diplomacy ties with Venezuela, even if Hugo Chávez appears as openly opposed to the US, his oil exports reliance to Washington stills a reality, as the US imports more than a half of its total exportations [40].
Regarding Chinese political influence, in spite of its announced commitment with a developping-countries cooperation and solidarity, China has failed to provide more concrete foreign initiatives to the region. An emblematical example was that, despite previously offering rhetorical support for Brazil’s claim for a permanent UN Security Council seat, China opposed the proposals for UN reform during the last M. Kofi Annan presidency [41].
In addition, some experts argue that, due to the migration patterns from Central and South American countries, the US has acquired greater cultural ties and longer-term economic importance to the region than China could ever have.
So, following this point of view, one could deduce as the US Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere, Roger Noriega, testified: “China’s influence in the region is minimal today” and “it is safe to say the United States has been and will continue to be the long-term partner of preference” in the region [42].

CONCLUSION

As mentionned above, China exerces an increasing economic expansion in Latin America, witnessed by a growing trade flow and an enlarging appetite for Latin American raw materials, especially concerning energy supply.
This heavy economic activity brings political implications related to China’s desire of being a major global actor, and most of all, it also brings determinant implications to the PRC’s “One China policy”, by switching Taiwanese diplomatic ties with the region.
In resume, as the Political Science professor François Lafargue argues, China has been adopting “the following modus operandi: it negotiates and ensures regular oil supplies in exchange for investment; it then uses commercial ties to generate agreements on political and military cooperation” [43].
Nevertheless, the consequences of the Chinese recent strategy in Latin America still unclear. As we saw, some observers foresee China as a revisionist raising power that could threat US tradional sphere of influence in the region. Meanwhile, others argue that Chinese approach in Latin America is a tipical one of a benign expansionist, being mostly restricted to commercial links.
Anyway, as pointed out above in this paper, Latin America represents a welcome diversification option for Chinese energy supply doctrine, according to its attempt in reducing its dependence to a few oil suppliers – especially when some of which reveal to be frenquently politically unstable like for example Iran or Sudan.
Therefore, how suggest political and logistical constraints, even if Latin America will probably always remain as a second-tier energy partner, the region is likely to be increasingly percieved as a major stage of oil and gas competition among the global powers – especially for China, which interests will have to face Indian rising competition, whose need for energy ressources supply will probably reveal enormous, as projections show that importations should account to 80 % of India’s total oil consumption in 2010 [44].

[1] DUMBAUGH K. & SULLIVAN M. P., China’s Growing Interest in Latin America. In: CRS Report for Congress. The Library of Congress, 2005, p.1
[2] LAFARGUE F., China’s Strategies in Latin America. In : Military Review. May-June 2006, p. 80
[3] Growing energy nexus. In: THE ECONOMIST (web edition), April 10th 2007.
[4] LAFARGUE F., p.80
[5] XUAN-TRANG HO, China’s Burgeoning Role in Latin America – a Threat to the U.S. ? Political Affairs Magazine, Jan-Feb 2005.
[6] MITCHELL D. & BAJPAEE C., China and Latin America, 2006.
[7] DUMBAUGH K. & SULLIVAN M. P, 2005, p.2
[8] LAFARGUE F., p.81
[9] DUMBAUGH K. & SULLIVAN M. P, 2005, p.2
[10] THE ECONOMIST (web edition), April 10th 2007.
[11] LAFARGUE F., p.83
[12] MITCHELL D. & BAJPAEE C., China and Latin America, 2006.
[13] BAJPAEE C., Chinese Energy Strategy in Latin America. China Brief, Vol. 5, issue 14, The Jamestown Foundation, June 21, 2005, p.1
[14] LAFARGUE F., p.80
[15] BAJPAEE C., p.1
[16] THE ECONOMIST (web edition), April 10th 2007.
[17] BAJPAEE C., p.1
[18] THE ECONOMIST (web edition), April 10th 2007.

[19] LAFARGUE F., p.81-82
[20] XUAN-TRANG HO, Jan-Feb 2005.
[21] MITCHELL D. & BAJPAEE C., 2006.
[22] XUAN-TRANG HO, Jan-Feb 2005.
[23] DUMBAUGH K. & SULLIVAN M. P, 2005, p.3
[24] XUAN-TRANG HO, Jan-Feb 2005.
[25] MITCHELL D. & BAJPAEE C., 2006.
[26] LAFARGUE F., p.80
[27] DUMBAUGH K. & SULLIVAN M. P, 2005, p.4
[28] BBC News, 7 June 2007, In: http://news.bbc.co.uk
[29] DUMBAUGH K. & SULLIVAN M. P, 2005, p.4
[30] LAFARGUE F., p.83
[31] DUMBAUGH K. & SULLIVAN M. P, 2005, p.5
[32] BAJPAEE C., p.1
[33] LAFARGUE F., p.82
[34] BAJPAEE C., p.1
[35] LANDAU S., Chinese Influence on the Rise of Latin America, 23 June 2005, Foregn Policy In Focus,
In: www.fpif.org
[36] LAFARGUE F., p.82
[37] MALENA J. E., La cooperación militar entre China y America Latina: realidad o mito ?, 9 June 2007, Observatorio de la Politica China, In : www.politica-china.org
[38] DUMBAUGH K. & SULLIVAN M. P, 2005, p.5
[39] THE ECONOMIST (web edition), April 10th 2007.
[40] MITCHELL D. & BAJPAEE C., 2006.
[41] THE ECONOMIST (web edition), April 10th 2007.
[42] DUMBAUGH K. & SULLIVAN M. P, 2005, p.6
[43] LAFARGUE F., p.80-81
[44] LAFARGUE F., p.84